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ABSTRACT
Adolescents with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
are known to have stronger preferences for smaller immediate
rewards over larger delayed rewards in delay discounting tasks
than their peers, which has been argued to reﬂect delay aversion.
Here, participants performed a delay discounting task with gains
and losses. In this latter condition, participants were asked
whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less money.
Following the core assumption of the delay aversion model that
individuals with ADHD have a general aversion to delay, one
would predict adolescents with ADHD to avoid waiting in both
conditions. Adolescents (12–17 years) with ADHD (n = 29) and
controls (n = 28) made choices between smaller immediate and
larger delayed gains, and between larger immediate and smaller
delayed losses. All delays (5–25 s) and gains/losses (2–10 cents)
were experienced. In addition to an area under the curve
approach, a mixed-model analysis was conducted to disentangle
the contributions of delay duration and immediate gain/delayed
loss amount to choice. The ADHD group chose the immediate
option more often than controls in the gain condition, but not in
the loss condition. The contribution of delay duration to immedi-
ate choices was stronger for the ADHD group than the control
group in the gain condition only. In addition, the ADHD group
scored higher on self-reported delay aversion, and delay aversion
was associated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition, but not
in the loss condition. In sum, we found no clear evidence for a
general aversion to delay in adolescents with ADHD.
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The delay aversion model proposes that children with attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) develop an aversion to delay due to negative emotions associated
with waiting, as a result of disturbances in the brain’s reward circuits (Sonuga-Barke,
Dalen, & Remington, 2003; Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, Sembi, & Smith, 1992). This can
explain their impulsive behavior in daily life. In the laboratory, impulsive choice is often
measured by the use of delay discounting tasks in which participants are repeatedly
asked to choose between smaller immediate rewards (e.g., 5 dollars now) and larger
delayed rewards (e.g., 10 dollars next week) (e.g., Scheres, de Water, & Mies, 2013). A
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reward loses its value if the delay to the reward increases, which is referred to as delay
discounting. It is well known that children and adolescents with ADHD prefer, more
often than controls, smaller immediate rewards over larger delayed rewards in these
types of tasks. In other words, they show steeper discounting of delayed rewards (see for
meta-analyses Jackson and MacKillop, 2016; Patros et al., 2016). Although the delay
aversion account of ADHD is intuitively appealing, to date, evidence for the role of
delay aversion in this impulsive choice behavior is limited. Only recently, neuroimaging
studies have provided support for the idea that delay aversion contributes to this
phenomenon, by showing increased involvement of emotional brain regions (i.e.,
amygdala and insula) in response to delay-related cues (Lemiere et al., 2012; Van
Dessel et al., 2018; Wilbertz et al., 2013). It is important to gain insight into what
drives impulsive choice in ADHD to be able to develop interventions to reduce this
choice style and its associated negative outcomes.
Other factors than delay aversion might play a role in this form of impulsive
choice. Steeper delay discounting in ADHD may also be due to reduced sensitivity
to reward magnitude (e.g., Luman, Van Meel, Oosterlaan, Sergeant, & Geurts, 2009;
Scheres, Tontsch, Thoeny, & Kaczkurkin, 2010). People who care less about the
magnitude of the reward might not wait for a larger reward. Another factor that
could explain steeper discounting in ADHD is a preference for reward immediacy:
individuals with ADHD may be especially sensitive to sooner rewards when these
can be obtained right now. When there is no immediate reward option available, but
rather the choice is between a sooner (but still delayed) smaller reward and a later
(even more delayed) larger reward, people are more likely to wait for larger rewards
than if the sooner option were an immediately available reward. However, we found
no support for such an exaggerated immediate reward preference in young adults
with increased symptom levels of ADHD (Mies, De Water, & Scheres, 2016).
Unpublished data from our group, on the other hand, showed that a small group
of adolescents with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD did show an increased immediate
reward preference compared to controls: When the choice was between receiving
$100 after 2 years and a smaller reward (varying in size) after 1 year, the ADHD
group was equally willing to wait for the larger amount as the control group was.
When, however, the choice was between receiving $100 after 1 year and a smaller
reward (varying in size) today, the ADHD group was less willing to wait for the
larger reward than the control group was. This suggests that immediacy of the soon
option is especially important for those with a clinical diagnosis of ADHD.
Similarly, Tripp and Alsop (2001) showed that children with ADHD are unusually
sensitive to delays preceding rewards, rather than delays following rewards (postre-
ward delays), suggesting that they have a “NOW” bias rather than being delay
averse. In other studies that included such postreward delays, however, both sensi-
tivity to reward immediacy and delay aversion appeared to contribute to a pre-
ference for immediate reward in older children/adolescents with ADHD (Marco
et al., 2009; Scheres et al., 2006). In sum, these ﬁndings are mixed. A more thorough
understanding of the role of delay aversion in impulsive choice behavior is thus
needed.
In the present study, we took another approach to examine whether delay aversion
contributes to discounting behavior in adolescents with ADHD: we examined not only
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discounting of rewards, but also of losses. The ADHD literature has focused mainly on
sensitivity to reward and on reward discounting. To our knowledge, loss discounting
has not been examined in ADHD yet. If ADHD is associated with a general aversion to
delay, then steeper discounting should not be limited to gains, but should also apply to
losses. Thus, in addition to asking participants to choose between smaller immediate
and larger delayed gains, we asked them to choose between larger immediate losses and
smaller delayed losses. That is, we asked them whether they were willing to wait in
order to lose less money. We used an experiential design in which all gains and losses
and all delays were experienced.
In contrast to the experiential design as applied in our study, previous loss
discounting studies have used hypothetical designs (i.e., losses and delays are not
actually experienced), in which participants were asked the opposite from what we
asked, namely to choose between a smaller immediate loss (e.g., pay 10 dollars now)
and a larger delayed loss (e.g., pay 100 dollars after 1 year). These studies have
shown that people are inclined to choose larger delayed losses, that is, they discount
losses (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Mies et al., 2016; Tanaka, Yamada,
Yoneda, & Ohtake, 2014; Thaler, 1981). It should be noted, though, that losses are
generally discounted less steeply than gains, which is known as the sign eﬀect (e.g.,
Estle et al., 2006). Loss discounting occurs because losing money now is experienced
as more aversive than losing money in a more distant future. In other words: people
postpone losses. Thus, in contrast to gain discounting (i.e., preference for the
immediate option), loss discounting reﬂects a preference for the delayed option in
the case of a hypothetical design. In both cases, the larger amount of the two choice
options – whether it is the larger delayed gain or the larger delayed loss – loses its
value with increasing delay to that gain or loss. In the current study, however, we
used an experiential design in which all delays were experienced. In such an
experiential task, both waiting and losing money are thought to be aversive, and
one would expect that no one would be willing to wait longer to lose more money
in these circumstances, whereas in a hypothetical task “waiting” for a loss is
appealing (putting it oﬀ). Therefore, as mentioned before, we reversed the questions:
instead of asking participants whether they wanted to wait longer and lose more
money, we asked them whether they were willing to wait in order to lose less
money. In this case, loss discounting reﬂects a preference for the large immediate
loss, that is, the large loss loses its (negative) value with increasing delay to the
smaller loss.
Thus, in the present study, we used an experiential delay discounting task in order to
examine the cost–beneﬁt trade-oﬀ between waiting and losing money in adolescents with
and without ADHD, in comparison with the more often examined cost–beneﬁt trade-oﬀ
between waiting and gaining money. By using an experiential instead of a hypothetical
design, we are more likely to capture delay aversion, and are therefore better able to
examine delay aversion as a mechanism contributing to steep discounting in ADHD.
First, based on the delay aversion model, which proposes that individuals with
ADHD have developed a general aversion to delay during childhood due to negative
emotions associated with waiting, we predicted that individuals with ADHD would
avoid waiting in both conditions, i.e., that they would show more discounting than
controls in both the gain and loss condition. To this purpose, we compared the area
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under the discounting curves (AUCs) of both groups for gains and losses separately.
Second, to gain more detailed insight into the diﬀerent factors that may contribute to
this discounting behavior, we used a mixed-model approach (Baayen, 2004). This
approach enabled us to tease apart the contributions of delay duration and immediate
gain amount to choices in the gain condition (see also de Water et al., 2017; Foerde
et al., 2016) and delay duration and delayed loss amount in the loss condition. We
examined whether adolescents with ADHD diﬀered from controls in these contribu-
tions to choices. We expected that individuals with ADHD would be more sensitive
than controls to delay, but not necessarily to amount, in both task conditions, in line
with the delay aversion model. Third, we examined whether self-reported delay aver-
sion in daily life and reward and punishment sensitivity diﬀered between groups.
Finally, we examined whether these self-report measures were associated with choices
in the delay discounting task (i.e., with average impatience, sensitivity to delay and to
amount; derived from the mixed-model analyses), in order to examine their convergent
validity (see also Thorell, Sjöwall, Mies, & Scheres, 2017). We hypothesized that self-
reported delay aversion would be associated with steeper discounting in general, i.e.,
with greater average impatience and delay sensitivity, and with less sensitivity to
amount, in both the gain and loss conditions. We further hypothesized that self-
reported reward sensitivity would be associated with sensitivity to amount in the gain
condition speciﬁcally, and punishment sensitivity with sensitivity to amount in the loss
discounting. See Figure 1 for an overview of the analyses corresponding to these
research questions and hypotheses.
Figure 1. Overview of the analyses corresponding to the research questions. AUC = area under the
(discounting) curve, BLUPs = best linear unbiased predictions (see mixed-eﬀects model analyses),
QDQ = quick delay questionnaire, BAS-reward = reward sensitivity subscale of the Behavioral
Inhibition/Approach System Scales (BIS/BAS), BIS = Behavioral Inhibition subscale of the BIS/BAS.
See Methods for further details.
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Methods
Participants
For a larger study that also included an functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
session (see Mies, Ma, De Water, Buitelaar, & Scheres, 2018), we recruited 34 adoles-
cents with ADHD (combined type) and 32 healthy controls between 12 and 17 years of
age (see Table 1). Participants and their parents gave written informed consent prior to
participation, and the study was approved by the local medical ethics committee.
Adolescents with ADHD were recruited via Karakter Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
University Centre and advertisements in local newspapers. Control participants were
recruited via advertisements and schools.
All participants in the ADHD group were selected on the basis of a preexisting
clinical diagnosis of ADHD of the combined type from a licensed child psychiatrist or
psychologist. The “behavioral disorders” module of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule
for Children (DISC-IV, parent version) was used to assess current validity of this
diagnosis,1 and the “whole life” module was used to assess symptom criteria of other
psychiatric disorders. Healthy volunteers were also screened for the same psychiatric
disorders using the DISC-IV. Additionally, parents were asked to complete the Child
Behavior Checklist (CBCL) (Achenbach and Rescorla, 2001) to assess emotional and
behavioral problems and the Disruptive Behavior Disorders Rating Scale (DBDRS)
(Oosterlaan, Scheres, Antrop, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2000; Pelham, Gnagy, Greenslade,
& Milich, 1992) to assess symptom severity of ADHD, oppositional deﬁant disorder
(ODD), and conduct disorder (CD). These latter two questionnaires were used as
descriptive instruments, and to help decide on whom to exclude from analyses in
addition to the DISC-IV.
Exclusion criteria were neurological illness, brain trauma, any contraindication for
having an MRI scan, the use of psychoactive medication that could not be discontinued
(i.e., medication other than psychostimulants), and IQ < 70. Participants in the ADHD
group were not allowed to have comorbid psychiatric disorders except for ODD (n = 2
according to DISC-IV) and CD (n = 2 according to DBDRS), while participants in the
control group were not allowed to have any current psychiatric disorder on the basis of
the DISC-IV, and not allowed to score within the clinical range of emotional or
behavioral problems on the CBCL or DBDRS.
One control participant was excluded because of IQ < 70 (based on two subtests of
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III; Kort et al., 2002: vocabulary,
block design), one because of an MRI contraindication, and another because she scored
within the clinical range of internalizing problems on the CBCL. Three ADHD parti-
cipants were excluded because of several comorbid disorders and/or the use of medica-
tion that could not be discontinued. Participants who used psychostimulants (n = 23)
were asked to discontinue their medication at least 24 h prior to the experiment.2 Two
participants (one ADHD and one control) did not perform the gain and loss discount-
ing task, which always followed the scan session, because of fatigue or lack of
1Four participants were in partial remission on the basis of the DISC-IV, CBCL, and DBDRS.
2All participants used methylphenidate except for one who used dexamphetamine. This latter participant reported last
intake 23 h prior to participation.
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motivation after the scan session. Another ADHD participant prematurely ended the
study because of anxiety in the scanning environment, and therefore also did not
participate in the gain and loss discounting task. Therefore, the data of 29 ADHD
and 28 control participants (Table 1) were used in the analyses of the gain and loss
discounting task.
Gain and loss discounting task
The task consisted of four blocks of 24 trials each. Blocks 1 and 3 were gain blocks, and
blocks 2 and 4 were loss blocks. The order of blocks was thus: Gain–Loss–Gain–Loss. In
the gain condition, a character in a boat was shown, representing the participant, and
both on the left and the right side of this character, an island with a treasure chest with
a monetary amount was shown (see Figure 2). Participants were instructed to choose to
sail to one of the two islands, one island always being close to the participant and the
other island being further away. Vertical lines indicated the level of delay corresponding
to the islands. In the gain condition, the treasure chest close to the participant
contained a small immediate gain (e.g., 2 cents in 1.5 s), and the treasure chest further
Table 1. Participant characteristics (means, standard deviations, and group diﬀerences).
ADHD (n = 29) Control (n = 28)
Number of females 10 (35%) 10 (36%) p = .92
Age (years) 15.1 ± 1.8 15.5 ± 1.7 p = .30
IQ estimatea 97 ± 15 108 ± 13 p = .005
DBDRS
Inattention 14.7 ± 1.8 10.5 ± 0.9 p < .001
Hyperactivity/impulsivity 14.9 ± 2.2 10.3 ± 0.9 p < .001
ODD 12.3 ± 1.9 10.4 ± 1.0 p < .001
CD 12.6 ± 2.5 11.3 ± 1.4 p = .018
CBCL (DSM scales)b
ADHD problems 67.3 ± 8.5 51.5 ± 2.8 p < .001
ODD problems 57.4 ± 7.1 50.5 ± 0.7 p < .001
CD problems 56.9 ± 6.0 50.5 ± 1.1 p < .001
Aﬀective problems 58.5 ± 7.1 51.7 ± 2.5 p < .001
Anxiety problems 54.4 ± 4.9 51.4 ± 3.3 p = .012
Somatic problems 54.9 ± 6.4 53.0 ± 4.0 p = .19
SRS (total score)c 56.8 ± 12.7 44.8 ± 4.56 p < .001
Trait impulsivity (BIS-11)c 73.2 ± 8.8 62.4 ± 9.1 p < .001
Reward sensitivity (BIS/BAS) 17.9 ± 1.7 17.2 ± 3.1 p = .33
Punishment sensitivity (BIS/BAS) 17.7 ± 3.9 19.1 ± 3.0 p = .14
Anhedonia (SHAPS)d 26.2 ± 7.8 24.0 ± 4.5 p = .22
Quick Delay Questionnaire
Delay discounting 7.1 ± 2.7 4.5 ± 2.3 p < .001
Delay aversion 12.1 ± 4.0 8.3 ± 3.5 p < .001
DBDRS = Disruptive Behavior Disorders Rating Scale (parent version), standardized scores: ≤14 normal range, 15
subclinical range, ≥16 clinical range for inattention and hyperactivity/impulsivity, ≤15 normal range, 16 subclinical
range, ≥17 clinical range for oppositional deﬁant disorder (ODD) and conduct disorder (CD); two participants with
ADHD scored within the clinical range for CD according to DBDRS; CBCL = Child Behavior Checklist (parent version),
T-scores for DSM scales: 50–64 normal range, 65–69 borderline clinical range, 70–100 clinical range; one participant
with ADHD scored within the clinical range for aﬀective problems according to CBCL; SRS = Social Responsiveness
Scale (parent version), T-scores: <40 high social responsiveness, 40–60 normal social responsiveness, 61–75 mild-to-
moderate deﬁcit in social responsiveness, ≥76 severe deﬁcit in social responsiveness. BIS-11 = Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale. BIS/BAS = Behavioral Inhibition/Approach System scales. SHAPS = Snaith–Hamilton Pleasure Scale.
aData from one control participant missing
bData from one ADHD participant missing
cData from one control and four ADHD participants missing
dData from one control and one ADHD participant missing.
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away contained a larger delayed gain (e.g., 10 cents in 25 s). In the loss condition,
participants were told that there were pirates on the islands instead of treasure chests
and that they had to pay money to the pirates in order to be able to dock their boat. On
the island close to the participant, they would lose 10 cents immediately (1.5 s), and on
the island further away they would have to wait longer in order to lose less money (e.g.,
2 cents in 25 s). In the gain condition, the reward associated with the delayed choice
was 10 cents (ﬁxed), and the rewards associated with the immediate option were 2, 4, 6,
and 8 cents. This was opposite in the loss condition: the loss associated with the
immediate option was −10 cents (ﬁxed), and the losses associated with the delayed
Figure 2. Task design showing an example of a choice presentation between (A) two islands with
treasure chests (gain condition) and (B) two islands with pirate hats (loss condition). The character in
the boat represented the participant. On the left and right side of this character, an island with
either a treasure chest (gain) or pirate hat (loss) was shown. Participants were instructed to choose
to sail to one of the two islands, one island always being close to the participant (no delay, 1.5 s)
and the other island being further away. Vertical lines indicated the level of delay corresponding to
the islands.
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option were −2, −4, −6, and −8 cents. In both conditions, delays were 1.5 (immediate
option), 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 s. To prevent strategies to deal with delay, as well as
possible group diﬀerences in initial delay perception inﬂuencing choice behavior,
participants were not informed about the exact delay durations. Instead, participants
were told that the delays were the same as the delays that were used in a delay and eﬀort
discounting task that they performed in the scanner. They had already experienced each
delay before performing the task.
The stimulus sequence consisted of the following: (1) a cue stimulus with the two
options (islands) to choose from, which was presented until a choice was made with a
maximum of 6 s, (2) a conﬁrmation of the participant’s choice (arrow pointing at island
of choice), presented for 1 s, (3) a ﬁxed thermometer that indicated the chosen delay,
which was presented for the proposed and chosen delay period, (4) a feedback stimulus
indicating the amount of money gained/lost on that trial, presented for 1 s, and (5) a
ﬁxation cross presented for 1 s.
All amounts that were won and lost were added so that participants actually lost
money that they had just gained in the previous block. The net amount was paid in cash
to the participant. In order to prevent that participants would worry that they might
lose money in the end, we gave them 50 cents to start with and told them that they
could use that amount to be able to pay in the loss condition. Despite this start amount,
it was still possible to lose more money than the money gained; therefore, unbeknownst
to participants, the minimum amount was set to 0 cents. None of the participants,
however, lost more money than they gained.
In each block, all choice combinations for either gain or loss were presented once,
leading to two presentations in total for each condition. In both conditions, 8 “catch”
trials (4 per block) were included in which participants were asked to choose between
the same amount (10 cents) at diﬀerent delays (e.g., gain or lose 10 cents after 1.5 s or
10 cents after 25s), or diﬀerent amounts for the same level of delay (e.g., gain or lose 2
cents after 1.5 s or 10 cents after 1.5 s). These catch trials served to check whether
participants made choices as expected, i.e., whether they preferred to minimize delays
and losses, and maximize gains, all else being equal (see supplemental data). Each block
lasted between approximately 3 and 7 min, depending on the participant’s choices. On
each trial, participants indicated their choice by pressing 1 (island on the left) or 2
(island on the right) on a keyboard. Participants were told that there was a ﬁxed
number of trials, and that there were no right or wrong answers, so that they should
choose what they preferred.
Questionnaires
Participants completed several questionnaires. A self-developed questionnaire was used
to assess health, including medication use and substance use. The Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale (BIS-11) (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) was used to compare groups on trait
impulsivity (internal consistency in current study: α = .81), the Behavioral Inhibition/
Approach System Scales (BIS/BAS) (Carver and White, 1994) to compare groups on
reward sensitivity (subscale BAS reward sensitivity, α = .82), and on punishment
sensitivity (subscale BIS, α = .66), the Snaith–Hamilton Pleasure Scale (SHAPS)
(Snaith et al., 1995) to compare groups on anhedonia or the loss of pleasure
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(α = .88), and the Quick Delay Questionnaire (QDQ) (Clare, Helps, & Sonuga-Barke,
2010) to compare groups on self-reported delay aversion (α = .77) and delay discount-
ing (α = .58).
Parents completed the CBCL and DBDRS to assess problem behaviors in their child
(see also Participants section), as well as the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS)
(Constantino and Gruber, 2005; Roeyers, Thys, Druart, De Schryver, & Schittekatte,
2011) to screen for autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptoms, since ASD and ADHD
symptoms often co-occur (e.g., Hartman, Geurts, Franke, Buitelaar, & Rommelse,
2016). The SRS was used as a descriptive instrument. See Table 1 for group compar-
isons on these questionnaires.
Procedure
During visit 1, participants completed the above-mentioned questionnaires, two
subtests of the WISC-III (vocabulary, block design) to estimate IQ, and got
acquainted with the scanning environment in a mock scanner. In the meantime,
parents were interviewed (DISC-IV) and completed the CBCL, DBDRS, and SRS.
During visit 2, participants ﬁrst conducted a delay and eﬀort discounting task
(reported elsewhere) in the scanner. After scanning, participants conducted the
gain and loss discounting task.
Participants were paid 25 euros for participation in the study and additionally earned
between 8.80 and 17.60 euros during the scan session, and between 0 and 2.70 euros
during the gain and loss discounting task.
Statistical analyses
Area under the discounting curve
Delay discounting was examined using the classical AUC approach (Myerson, Green, &
Warusawitharana, 2001). Subjective values (SVs), indicative of the amount at which an
individual is indiﬀerent between the delayed and immediate gain/loss, were calculated
for the delayed gain and immediate loss (10 cents) for each level of delay preceding the
larger gain or smaller loss, for each participant. SVs were calculated on the basis of the
proportion of delayed choices (Boettiger et al., 2007; Eppinger, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2012). Subsequently, for each individual, the AUCs for gains and losses were calculated
in accordance with the method described by Myerson et al. (2001). AUC ranges from 0
to 1. Smaller AUCs reﬂect steeper discounting.
Two participants with ADHD had initially not understood task instructions: after the
ﬁrst gain block, they indicated that they thought that pirates would have incidentally
taken away money during the gain block. This ﬁrst gain block was therefore not taken
into account in the SV and AUC calculation for these two participants, and was also
excluded from the mixed-model analyses mentioned below. Another two participants
with ADHD did not ﬁnish the last (loss) block of the task because they accidentally
aborted the task by pressing the ESC key. For these latter two participants, all choices
up to the point of task abortion were taken into account in the SV and AUC calcula-
tion, as well as in the mixed-model analyses.
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Two independent-samples t tests were conducted in SPSS to examine group diﬀer-
ences in the AUC for gains and for losses (see Figure 1).
Mixed-eﬀects model analyses
In addition to the main AUC analyses, the diﬀerent factors contributing to task choices
(Figure 1) were analyzed with generalized linear mixed-eﬀects models using the lme4
package (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in R (version 3.2.0; R Core Team,
2013). The dependent variable was choice (1 = immediate, 0 = delayed). See supple-
mental data for the formal notations of the ﬁtted mixed-eﬀects models.
The ﬁrst model was estimated based on the gain condition. This model included a
ﬁxed intercept and the following ﬁxed eﬀects: (1) the delay preceding the larger gain, (2)
the amount of the immediate gain, (3) group, (4) the interaction between group and
delay, and (5) the interaction between group and amount. For each participant, random
adjustments to the ﬁxed intercept and to the slopes of the eﬀects for delay and amount
were included. All correlation terms among the random eﬀects were estimated, result-
ing in a model “maximal with respect to the random eﬀects” as suggested by Barr, Levy,
Scheepers, and Tily (2013), to avoid inﬂated Type 1 errors. Delay and amount were
standardized (centered and scaled) and group was speciﬁed by a sum-to-zero contrast
(1 = ADHD, −1 = controls).
The second model was estimated based on the loss condition. This model was similar
to the previous model based on gains. In this case, however, the ﬁxed eﬀect of amount
that was included in the model concerned the amount of the delayed loss instead of the
immediate gain.
For the mixed-eﬀects model analyses described above (see also Figure 1), the
optimizer “bobyqa” was used, with a maximum number of 1 × 109 iterations.
p-Values were determined using likelihood ratio tests as implemented in the mixed
function of the afex package (Singmann, Bolker, & Westfall, 2015). All ﬁxed and
random eﬀects estimate how a change in one of the predictors (e.g., the eﬀect of
amount on immediate gain choice) aﬀects the dependent variable (e.g., immediate
gain choice) when the other variables are held constant (Baayen, 2004).
In addition to examining the interactions between group and delay and group and
amount, we also directly compared groups on their average preference for immediate
gain/loss (i.e., average impatience), sensitivity to delay, and sensitivity to amount (see
Figure 1), by extracting three so-called best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs; the
model’s best estimate for each participant’s intercept and regression coeﬃcients) for
each participant. These BLUPs were again estimated for the gain and loss condition
separately: (1) Average impatience (random intercept). This reﬂects each participant’s
likelihood to choose the immediate option for an average amount and delay. Higher
values indicate a greater tendency to choose the immediate option. This BLUP is similar
to the AUC in that it includes both the inﬂuence of delay and amount on choice.
Consistent with this point, participants’ random intercept was highly correlated with
their AUC for both the gain condition (rho = –.98, p < .001) and the loss condition
(rho = –.90, p < .001); (2) Amount sensitivity (i.e., random amount slope), indexing the
unique contribution of the immediate gain amount (for the gain condition) and delayed
loss amount (for the loss condition) to choice. Higher values indicate a greater tendency
to choose the immediate option when the immediate gain was high or the delayed loss
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was high; (3) Delay sensitivity (random delay slope), indexing the unique contribution
of delay to the delayed option to choice. Higher values indicate a greater tendency to
choose the immediate option when delays were longer. To examine group diﬀerences in
average impatience, delay sensitivity, and amount sensitivity, we used independent-
samples t tests (in SPSS) on these BLUPs (see Figure 1).
Group diﬀerences in self-report measures
Groups were compared on their self-reported delay aversion (QDQ), as well as on
reward and punishment sensitivity (BAS reward scale, BIS scale) using independent-
samples t tests (see Figure 1).
Correlations between self-report measures and discounting across groups
We computed Spearman rank-order (rho) correlations3 between the diﬀerent BLUPs –
average impatience, amount sensitivity, and delay sensitivity – and (1) self-reported
daily-life delay aversion (QDQ), (2) reward sensitivity (BAS reward scale), and (3)
punishment sensitivity (BIS scale) (see also Figure 1).
Results
Area under the curve analysis
There was a signiﬁcant eﬀect of group on gain discounting (t(55) = 2.009, p = .050,
d = 0.53), but not on loss discounting (t(55) = 1.67, p = .102, d = 0.44) (see Figure 3),
suggesting that the ADHD group showed more discounting than controls in the gain
task, but this eﬀect did not reach statistical signiﬁcance in the loss task.
Mixed-eﬀects model analyses
Group diﬀerences in contributions of delay duration and gain/loss amount to choice
Model 1 showed a main eﬀect of group on immediate gain choice (B = 1.10, SE = 0.52,
χ2(1) = 4.70, p = .03), indicating that adolescents with ADHD chose the immediate gain
Figure 3. Subjective values of (a) delayed gains (10 cents) and (b) immediate losses (−10 cents) as a
function of delay for the ADHD and control group.
3Shapiro–Wilk tests indicated that none of the BLUPs were normally distributed; all ps< .001.
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more often than controls, in line with the medium-sized group eﬀect in the AUC
analysis. No main eﬀect of delay was found in this model, but the very high correlation
between delay and intercept may have obscured such an eﬀect. In a model in which this
correlation was not explicitly estimated, we did ﬁnd a main eﬀect of delay on immediate
gain choice (B = 1.08, SE = 0.16, χ2(1) = 24.79, p < .001), indicating that participants
chose the immediate gain more frequently as the delay preceding the larger gain
increased, i.e., gains were discounted. There was also a main eﬀect of amount on
immediate gain choice (B = 1.38, SE = 0.34, χ2(1) = 18.49, p < .001): participants
chose the immediate gain more frequently as its amount increased. No signiﬁcant
interactions between group and delay (B = 0.25, SE = 0.22, χ2(1) = 1.43, p = .23) and
group and amount (B = 0.01, SE = 0.19, χ2(1) = 2.48, p = .12) were found.
In line with the AUC analysis, model 2 showed no signiﬁcant eﬀect of group on
immediate loss choice (B = 0.72, SE = 0.50, χ2(1) = 2.04, p = .15). There was a main eﬀect
of delay on immediate loss choice (B = 1.25, SE = 0.16, χ2(1) = 25.51, p < .001), indicating
that participants chose the larger immediate loss more often as the delay preceding the
smaller loss increased, i.e., losses were discounted. The eﬀect of amount on immediate loss
choice did not reach signiﬁcance (B = 0.75, SE = 0.39, χ2(1) = 3.50, p = .06). Again, no
signiﬁcant interactions between group and delay (B = 0.09, SE = 0.21, χ2(1) = 0.18, p = .68),
or group and amount (B = 0.06, SE = 0.19, χ2(1) = 0.08, p = .77) were found.
Group diﬀerences in average impatience, delay sensitivity, and amount sensitivity
For gains, adolescents with ADHD showed a signiﬁcantly higher average impatience
(t = −2.10, p = .04, d = 0.56) and delay sensitivity (t = −2.07, p = .04, d = 0.55) than
controls, but groups did not diﬀer in their amount sensitivity (t = 0.86, p = .39,
d = 0.23). For losses, there were no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences in average impatience,
or delay and amount sensitivity (all ps > .71) (see Figure 4).
Group diﬀerences in self-report measures
Participants with ADHD reported to be more delay averse in daily life than those
without ADHD. No group diﬀerences were found in self-reported reward (BAS-reward)
and punishment sensitivity (BIS) (see Table 1).
Correlations between Average Impatience, Delay Sensitivity, Amount Sensitivity and
Self-report Measures across Groups
Participants’ self-reported delay aversion (QDQ) was positively correlated with their
average impatience (rho = .38, p = .004) and delay sensitivity (rho = .35, p = .008) in the
gain condition, but not in the loss condition (ps > .74) (Figure 5). No signiﬁcant
associations were found between participants’ self-reported reward (BAS-reward) or
punishment sensitivity (BIS) with their amount sensitivity in the gain and loss condi-
tion, respectively (ps > .36).
Discussion
This study examined the contribution of delay aversion to “impulsive” choice in ADHD
by measuring both gain and loss discounting using an experiential delay discounting
task in which all gains and losses, and all delays, were experienced. Importantly, in
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contrast to previous research, we included a condition in which participants had to
choose between larger immediate and smaller delayed losses. On the basis of the delay
aversion model, proposing that individuals with ADHD are delay averse, we predicted
Figure 4. Best linear unbiased predictions (BLUPs) for (a) average impatience and (b) sensitivity to
delay and to amount of the immediate gain or delayed loss for the ADHD and control group. The
ADHD group chose the immediate gain more often than the control group, and was more sensitive
to delay than the control group in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition.
Figure 5. Relationship between sensitivity to delay and self-reported daily-life delay aversion measured
with the Quick Delay Questionnaire (QDQ) for (a) gains and (b) losses. Individuals who reported to be more
delay averse were more sensitive to delay in the gain condition, but not in the loss condition.
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that adolescents with ADHD would be less willing to wait for both gains and losses.
Our main AUC ﬁndings showed that groups diﬀered from each other in their will-
ingness to wait for larger gains, but not for smaller losses, although it should be noted
that eﬀect sizes for the gain and loss condition were both in the medium range (d = 0.53
and 0.44, respectively), comparable to a recent meta-analysis by Patros et al. (2016)
(d = 0.47). In other words, adolescents with ADHD appeared to be only slightly more
willing to pay more money than controls in order to minimize waiting times. This
suggests that delay aversion in ADHD seems to be context dependent. Furthermore,
mixed-model analyses showed that the ADHD group was more sensitive to delay than
the control group, but only in the gain condition. Finally, higher levels of self-reported
delay aversion in daily life were associated with more immediate gain choices, but not
with immediate loss choices. Together, these results are not fully supportive of the delay
aversion model in a broader sense. To our knowledge, existing research on delay
aversion in ADHD so far has focused exclusively on delays preceding gains. Our
ﬁndings suggest that adolescents with ADHD might be especially averse to delays
preceding gains and less to delays preceding losses, and may warrant further reﬁnement
of the delay aversion model of ADHD.
In addition to the group diﬀerence in delay discounting of gains, the ADHD group
diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the control group on several other measures. As expected,
the ADHD group scored higher on questionnaires that assess inattention and hyper-
activity/impulsivity symptoms, but also on trait impulsivity, and delay discounting and
delay aversion in daily life. In line with reaction time studies (Koﬂer et al., 2013),
participants with ADHD were slower in responding during the discounting task and
more variable in their response times than controls (see supplemental data). Our
sample therefore appears to comprise a representative ADHD and control group.
Our AUC ﬁndings suggest that adolescents with ADHD are not willing to pay more
money than controls to minimize waiting times. In addition to this classical AUC
approach, the mixed-model analysis approach enabled us to examine the contributions
of delay sensitivity and amount sensitivity to “impulsive” choice, thus giving more
insight into the underlying processes involved. These analyses suggest that delay
sensitivity plays an important role in the relatively strong preference for smaller
immediate gains in individuals with ADHD compared to controls, while this was not
the case for losses. In general, for gains, the relatively impatient participants (across
groups) appear to be strongly driven by their sensitivity to delay, and less by their
sensitivity to amount. The relatively patient participants, however, appear to be mostly
driven by their sensitivity to amount. This is in line with ﬁndings from another study in
our laboratory that examined delay discounting of gains in typically developing ado-
lescents (de Water et al., 2017). It emphasizes the need to consider individual diﬀer-
ences in choice behavior, as diﬀerent factors appear to underlie choices for those
individuals at the most patient versus those at the most impatient end of the spectrum.
For losses, relatively impatient participants also appeared to be mainly driven by their
sensitivity to delay. Interestingly, though, relatively patient participants were not driven
by their sensitivity to the amount of the delayed loss, as was the case for gains. It should
be noted, though, that the lack of an interaction between group and delay in model 1
(gains) seems inconsistent with these ﬁndings. This discrepancy may be due to the fact
that testing moderation by including interaction terms is less powerful (i.e., increased
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Type II error) than using t tests to directly compare two groups (caused by larger
standard errors of interaction terms). This has led some researchers to argue that t tests
may be a more appropriate method to test for moderation of eﬀects (Robinson, Tomek,
& Schumacker, 2013).
Despite the ﬁnding that delay sensitivity appears to underlie choices for larger
immediate losses, our other ﬁndings, such as a lack of association between delay
aversion measured with the QDQ and loss discounting behavior, suggest that delay
aversion does not appear to be driving “impulsive” choice in our loss discounting task.
Thus, it seems that delay aversion is especially related to gains, and does not extend to
losses to the same degree. We should, however, be careful when interpreting these
results, as there were many participants who did not show any loss discounting at all
(14 ADHD and 17 control participants; 9 ADHD and 16 control participants did not
show any gain discounting). This may have resulted in a ceiling eﬀect and reduced
power to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects. Results could perhaps have been diﬀerent if the delays
involved would have been longer and/or the amounts at stake higher. Future studies
are, therefore, needed to see whether loss discounting truly diﬀers from gain
discounting.
Our ﬁndings suggest that the context in which waiting occurs is important. Waiting
for gains appears to be more diﬃcult for adolescents with ADHD than for controls
when an immediate gain option is available. Aversion to a relatively large loss, on the
other hand, seems to outweigh aversion to delay in most individuals. The items of the
QDQ that target delay aversion in daily life (Clare et al., 2010) do not include this type
of context. For example, “I am usually calm when I have to wait in queues” and “Having
to wait for things makes me feel stressed and tense” do not imply whether the waiting is
related to something rewarding or punishing. Delay aversion scores, however, were only
signiﬁcantly correlated with delay sensitivity in the gain condition. Perhaps, in the case
of (monetary) loss, individuals with ADHD are able to overrule their aversion to delay
in order to choose economically. Scheres, Tontsch, and Thoeny (2013) showed that
youth with ADHD were more likely to act upon their (negative) feelings in a typical
delay discounting task with gains only, i.e., they were less likely to wait for larger gains
than controls, even though they rated waiting as equally diﬃcult. While controls might
be able to overrule their negative feelings associated with waiting for both larger gains
and smaller losses, adolescents with ADHD might only be able to overrule these when
losses are involved. This implies that adolescents with ADHD are equally sensitive or
even more sensitive to (monetary) loss than controls, which argues against the idea that
ADHD is associated with decreased sensitivity to punishment (Luman, Tripp, &
Scheres, 2010; van Meel, Oosterlaan, Heslenfeld, & Sergeant, 2005). A recent question-
naire study by Luman, van Meel, Oosterlaan, and Geurts (2012) also lacked support for
decreased punishment sensitivity in ADHD, and in our current sample, we also found
no signiﬁcant group diﬀerence on the BIS subscale of the BIS/BAS (Table 1). An earlier
study by Luman, Oosterlaan, Knol, and Sergeant (2008) showed that children with
ADHD were, unlike controls, blind to the magnitude of a loss, but they were just as
sensitive to its frequency. If the magnitude of a loss does not matter to them, then
steeper discounting (preferring the sooner larger loss) in our loss condition would have
been expected, but this was not the case. Most studies to date, however, have focused on
reward sensitivity in ADHD, and less on punishment sensitivity. More research is
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needed on the latter topic in order to understand loss-based decision-making in
ADHD.
According to the delay aversion model, delay aversion develops due to negative
experiences with delay, which is thought to be related to disturbances in the brain’s
reward circuit. Neuroimaging studies in ADHD have rather consistently shown
decreased activation in the ventral striatum (VS) in adults with ADHD while anticipat-
ing (delayed) reward (for an overview see Plichta and Scheres, 2014). Functional MRI
studies speciﬁcally examining delay aversion in ADHD suggest an important role for
the amygdala. Increased amygdala activation has been found in individuals with ADHD
compared to controls in response to cues of impending delay (Lemiere et al., 2012; Van
Dessel et al., 2018), as well as with increasing length of anticipated (Wilbertz et al.,
2013) and experienced (Mies et al., 2018) delay. This suggests that delays carry a
stronger emotional value or salience for individuals with ADHD than for others.
Since loss discounting appears to be less strongly related to delay aversion than gain
discounting, it is possible that the associated neural responses diﬀer too. Future studies
should thus examine the underlying neural mechanisms of loss-based decision-making
as compared to reward-based decision making in ADHD.
Several limitations of this study are worth mentioning. We found less discount-
ing than expected in both the gain and loss task, and especially the loss condition
appeared to suﬀer from a ceiling eﬀect (but there was a main eﬀect of delay in
both conditions (results not shown), providing support for discounting, see also
Figure 3). It should be noted that the same group of participants performed a
delay and eﬀort discounting (DD-ED) task (reported elsewhere) just prior to the
gains and losses task, in which also a small – but statistically signiﬁcant – group
diﬀerence emerged in discounting of gains. It is possible that extensive experience
with this type of task led to less discounting in the current task. Waiting resulted
in more monetary gain in the DD-ED task, and since participants received this
money just before starting the gain and loss task, this may have made waiting in
this second task more appealing for participants. Future studies may want to
experiment with longer delay durations in order to diminish ceiling eﬀects in
discounting behavior. Alternatively, it is possible that participants were mentally
fatigued after having performed for some time already, leaving limited resources
for self-control (e.g., Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007), which is thought to lead to
more discounting instead. Finally, the sample size did not allow us to control for
group diﬀerences in ODD, CD, internalizing problems (depression, anxiety), and
ASD symptoms in the analyses. We also could not reliably rule out potential
eﬀects from (long-term) stimulant use in our ADHD sample. We can thus not rule
out the possibility that our ﬁndings may be driven by other factors which are
(inherently) associated with ADHD.
In conclusion, we found no clear evidence for a general aversion to delay in
adolescents with ADHD. Together, the AUC and mixed-model ﬁndings suggest that
adolescents with ADHD have a stronger preference for smaller immediate gains over
larger delayed gains than controls, but that this does not extend to the same degree to
losses. Hence, the ﬁndings suggest that delay aversion in ADHD is stronger for gains
than losses.
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